Robinson Air Crane, LLC v. Saint Lucie County, Florida
FAA Docket No:
16-18-02
Author:
Kevin C. Willis, Director of Airport Compliance and Management Analysis
Complainant(s):
Robinson Air Crane, LLCRespondent(s):
St. Lucie County, FloridaAirport(s):
Treasure Coast International Airport (FPR)
Holding:
Dismissed with prejudice (no violation).Abstract:
Complainant, a tenant at the airport pursuant to a sublease, purchased a hangar—Hangar 8 West (“Hangar 8W”)—on its leased property where it conducted large helicopter storage. (p. 4.) Complainant approached the Respondent on several occasions to inquire about leasing and developing vacant space adjacent to Hangar 8W, and about leasing and developing property elsewhere (along a nearby roadway known as Tailwind Drive) for the purpose of constructing hangars for aircraft storage. (pp. 4-5.)
In evaluating Robinson’s site plan for the development of the land adjacent to its Hangar 8W to St. Lucie in 2015, a Development Review Committee of the St. Lucie County Planning and Development Services concluded that the plan did not contain adequate storm water drainage, did not avoid encroaching on a pre-existing leasehold, and did not relocate a water main—all factors that had previously been identified and required during the planning and development process. (p. 5.) The Committee stated in a report that St. Lucie had requested that Robinson provide documentation in connection with these items, however Robinson failed to address the Committee’s concerns. (p. 5.) According to St. Lucie, moreover, Robinson was notified of these deficiencies on three occasions and given the opportunity to meet with the Committee to discuss its site plan but failed to appear or submit a revised plan. (p. 5.)
Instead of pursuing the sublease of the vacant parcel adjacent to Hangar 8W and construction of a new hangar, Robinson stated that the vacant parcel was too small for the type of hangar it wished to construct and then proposed a larger hangar development along Tailwind Drive. (p. 5.) Because hangar construction along Tailwind Drive was not envisioned in the Airport Master Plan or the Airport Layout Plan, St. Lucie invited Robinson to participate in the public process for updating the plans. (p. 5.) Robinson neither participated in that public process nor submitted a required site plan for the construction of hangars along Tailwind Drive, however. (p. 5.) Rather, Robinson claimed that St. Lucie’s delay of Robinson’s efforts to construct hangars and its refusal to accept Robinson’s development plans left it no option but to file a complaint. (p. 5.)
In its formal complaint, Robinson alleged that St. Lucie engaged in practices at FPR that violated 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a) and FAA Grant Assurance 1, General Federal Requirements, by refusing to allow Robinson to build hangars resulting in predatory conduct and illegal restraint of trade in violation of 15 USC § 1, et. seq., the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; Grant Assurance 5, Preserving Rights and Powers, by denying Robinson the right to develop open, unused and developable land at the Airport; Grant Assurance 19, Operation and Maintenance, by precluding construction of the hangars when there is an established need for hangar space and denying Airport users the ability to service medium sized jets and large helicopters; Grant Assurance 22, Economic Nondiscrimination, by attempting to restrict airport development which only benefited the sole FBO operating at FPR; and Grant Assurance 23, Exclusive Rights, by granting another an exclusive right of providing FBO services at FPR but denying that right to Robinson. Complainant sought an order: (1) denying Respondent future AIP grants and suspending fund payments for 6 months or until the alleged violated are rectified; (2) requiring Respondent to submit a corrective action plan; and (3) requiring Respondent to grant the Complainant the right to build hangars and carry out the development plan as proposed.
The Director identified and analyzed five issues.
Issue 1—Grant Assurance 1
The first question was whether St. Lucie violated Grant Assurance 1, General Federal Requirements, by refusing to grant Robinson the right to construct and rent the hangars resulting in predatory conduct and an illegal restraint of trade in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1, et. seq. The Director rejected the contention that St. Lucie’s refusal to grant Robinson the right to construct and rent the hangars was predatory conduct and an illegal restraint of trade in violation of 15 USC § 1, et. seq. The Director had previously determined that 14 C.F.R. Part 16 is not the appropriate forum for alleged violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. (See Mansfield Heliflight, Inc. v. City of Burlington, FAA Docket No. 16-14-06 (September 5, 2017)). In keeping with the precedent set in Mansfield, the Director stated that Robinson’s claim that St. Lucie violated Grant Assurance 1, General Federal Requirements, through its alleged restriction of trade in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, was outside of the jurisdiction of this proceeding.
Issue 2—Grant Assurance 5
The second question that the Director addressed was whether St. Lucie violated Grant Assurance 5, Preserving Rights and Powers, by repeatedly denying Robinson the right to develop open, unused, and developable land at FPR. More specifically, Robinson argued that despite its submission of plans, the expenditure of over $20,000, and multiple meetings with St. Lucie and the FPR FBO, its proposal ultimately met with resistance and disapproval. (p. 13.) St. Lucie answered that it never denied Robinson the ability to develop land at FPR and that the County had followed a process under its county code where the County held a pre-application meeting with the proposed developer, followed by the developer submitting a site plan for the Development Review Committee to consider. (p. 13.) Under the code, if the Committee “[i]nform[ed] the applicant in writing of the deficiencies of the application,” the applicant was required to notify the County whether it intended to address the cited deficiencies. (p. 13.) If the developer did not respond to the deficiencies within 120 days, the process must restart and an additional fee must be paid. (p. 13.) The County followed this process in reviewing Robinson’s original proposed hangar development. (p. 13.) Robinson submitted a site plan for the first single hangar sublease/construction, but failed to follow the development process under the County’s Land Development code, according to the Respondent. (p. 13.) Robinson did not attend its meeting with the Committee and never responded to the deficiencies identified in the Committee’s report. (p. 13.) Moreover, with respect to its second proposal for development, Robinson never submitted an official site plan for a development along Tailwind Drive, and, despite the County’s encouragement, did not participate in the public process for amending the Airport Master Plan and Airport Layout Plan. (p. 13.)
In evaluating this information, the Director cited FAA Order 5190.6B, which describes the responsibilities assumed by the owners of public-use airports developed with federal assistance under Grant Assurance 5, including the responsibility for enforcing rules, regulations, and ordinances as necessary to ensure the safe and efficient operation of the airport. See Ricks v. Millington Municipal Airport, FAA Docket No. 16-98-19, Director’s Determination (July 1, 1999). The sponsor’s consideration of an application should result in a clear process and provide reasons for its decision to deny a user’s proposal. See Bodin v. County of Santa Clara, FAA Docket No. 16-11-06.
In this context, the Director found that St. Lucie developed rules, regulations, or ordinances necessary to ensure the safe and efficient operation of the airport as set forth in FAA Order 5190.6B and in the precedent espoused in Ricks. (p. 13.) The Director further found that, as in Bodin, St. Lucie utilized a transparent and coherent process to consider applications for development such as Robinson’s and it applied that process in its consideration of the development plan Robinson offered for the sublease of land adjacent to its Hangar 8A and in its consideration of Robinson’s offer to develop land on Tailwind Drive.
The Director also found that Robinson failed to follow up with its plans to develop the site adjacent to Hangar 8W and, in fact, Robinson abandoned this plan. (p. 13-14.) Robinson had been unresponsive in the process and could not claim St. Lucie was violating Grant Assurance 5, Preserving Rights and Powers. (p. 14.) The Director found that, “similar to the complainant’s actions in Mansfield, Robinson failed to provide input and failed to provide a development plan to St. Lucie’s Master Plan or ALP with a clear understanding of how the Tailwind Drive land would be used.” (p. 14.) Robinson had several chances to present this information but failed to avail itself of these opportunities, according to the Director. (p. 14.) As such, Robinson could not complain that its abandoned attempts to acquire the single hangar lease and/or its failure to assist in the revision of the FPR Master Plan to develop Tailwind Drive somehow resulted in St. Lucie’s violation of its grant assurances.
Issue 3—Grant Assurance 19
The Director next considered whether St. Lucie was “violating Grant Assurance 19, Operation and Maintenance, by allegedly precluding construction of hangars (by denying Robinson’s initial application and not acting upon its second request) when, as stated by Robinson, there was an established need for hangar space and denying Airport users the ability to service medium sized jets and large helicopters.” (p. 14.) The Director found no violation.
In responding to allegations that it violated Grant Assurance 19, St. Lucie argued that Robinson’s allegations concerned leasehold areas, which were not subject to Grant Assurance 19. (p. 14.) Moreover, Respondent asserted that it made clear from the outset of negotiations that Robinson would need to design, obtain permits, and construct drainage improvements necessitated by its proposed hangar. (p. 14.) Robinson agreed to and initially attempted to meet those terms, but abandoned its plans to develop the parcel because it decided that the available space between pre-existing leases was too small. (p. 14-15.) Additionally, St. Lucie asserted that neither Robinson’s dissatisfaction with the size of the vacant parcel nor St. Lucie’s insistence that Robinson provide adequate storm water management facilities to support its proposed development violated Grant Assurance 19. (p. 15.)
To support these claims, St. Lucie cited Desert Wings v. City of Redmond, FAA Docket No. 16-09-07 (November 10, 2010). (p. 15.) St. Lucie argued that none of Robinson’s allegations raised a “claim that [St. Lucie] is not maintaining aeronautical facilities at the Airport in a safe and serviceable condition.” (p. 15.)
The Director disagreed with St. Lucie’s interpretation of the precedent in Desert Wings and its argument that Grant Assurance 19 applied only to aeronautical or movement areas of an airport, however. (p. 15.) In fact, the Director noted, the FAA had ruled on alleged violations of Grant Assurance 19 in various cases as it applied to taxiways in non-movement areas. See generally Roadhouse Aviation LLC v. City of Tulsa, FAA Docket No. 16-05-08; Hicks v. City of Mount Airy, FAA Docket No. 16-15-07; Paskar v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, FAA Case No. 16-11-04; Town of Fairview v. City of McKinney, FAA Docket 16-99-04. As such, the Director was not persuaded by St. Lucie’s argument that Grant Assurance 19, applied only to airport movement areas. Accordingly, the Director denied St. Lucie’s motion to dismiss Count III of the Complaint. (p. 15.)
That said, the Director agreed with St. Lucie’s argument that no evidence existed to show that it was neglecting to maintain aeronautical facilities at the Airport, particularly given evidence that the St. Lucie County Development Review Committee’s report showed that the County analyzed and conducted storm water management at the Airport in a serious manner. (p. 15.) In addition, the Director agreed with the precedent set forth in Desert Wings and with St. Lucie’s argument that it should not be made to improve the parcel adjacent to Hangar 8W for the benefit of Robinson when that parcel was always intended to be a drainage swale. (p. 16.) According to the Director, it was “disingenuous for Robinson to ask to lease property identified as a ‘drainage swale,’ submit a site plan that does not adequately resolve the drainage issue so as to erect a hangar, and then blame St. Lucie for not having a drainage plan that would accommodate a hangar being built at that location.” (p. 16.)
In summary, in disposing of the claims under Grant Assurance 19, the Director stated: “The very purpose of Grant Assurance 19 is to insure that the sponsor operates airport facilities in a safe and serviceable condition and in accordance with the minimum standards as may be required under law for maintenance and operation.” Robinson had provided no evidence that St. Lucie was not operating the facilities in a safe and serviceable condition or contrary to minimum standards for maintenance and operation under law. (p. 17.) Therefore, Robinson’s allegation that the denial by St. Lucie to lease and develop airport property when there was a need for hangar space, which allegedly denied airport users the means to service jets and helicopters, did not constitute a violation of Grant Assurance 19. (p. 17.)
Issue 4—Grant Assurance 22
The fourth issue addressed by the Director was whether St. Lucie had violated Grant Assurance 22, Economic Nondiscrimination, by limiting a kind or class of aeronautical use of FPR, when it allegedly refused to permit hangar construction, failed to negotiate the hangar project in good faith, and refused to allow the construction of hangars on usable airport land.
Robinson had alleged that “[d]espite the . . . communicated goals and intent of [St. Lucie to expand the airport as set forth in its Master Plan], it has over the past two and one half (2.5) years discriminated against [Robinson] and taken active measures to limit aviation related services to the public in accordance with its own goals as set forth in the Plan.” (p. 17.) Robinson also asserted that, as a sponsor receiving AIP funds, St. Lucie was obligated to make the airport available for public use on reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination to all types, kinds and classes of aeronautical activities, including commercial aeronautical activities offering services to the public at the airport. (p. 17.) Robinson also alleged that St. Lucie actively limited a kind or class of aeronautical use of the Airport and had not demonstrated the limitation is necessary for the safe operation of the Airport or necessary to serve the civil aviation needs of the public. (p. 17.) Next, Robinson alleged that St. Lucie refused to permit hangar construction that would provide utilization of medium-sized aircraft, large helicopters, and aviation services to the public; Robinson also alleged that this refusal was driven by St. Lucie’s impermissible desire to usurp public opportunities for its own benefit by building its own hangers or to protect the interests of the existing, sole FBO, APP Jet Center. (p. 18.)
Finally, Robinson claimed that operating the airport for aeronautical use was St. Lucie’s primary obligation and that part of that obligation was to provide the opportunity for leaseholders to develop airport property for aeronautical use. (p. 18.) St. Lucie had an obligation to make suitable areas or space available on reasonable terms to those who are willing and otherwise qualified to offer the needed services. (p. 18.) Robinson claimed there was a need for hangar space at FPR and that it has demonstrated it as qualified to offer the needed services. (p. 18.) Robinson alleged it submitted a proposal to build hangars on reasonable and favorable terms and St. Lucie failed to negotiate the hangar project in good faith. (p. 18.) Robinson stated that attempting to restrict development at the airport, which only benefited APP Jet Center and St. Lucie and disregarded the public’s needs, was inconsistent with St. Lucie’s federal obligations and contrary to Robinson’s rights. (p. 18.) Robinson alleged that St. Lucie had purposefully refused to allow the construction of hangars on usable land within the borders of the airport in contravention of the requirements of the FAA and the assurances St. Lucie made under AIP. (p. 18.) Robinson concluded that St. Lucie’s refusal was an unreasonable denial of access to aeronautical development and a violation of Grant Assurance No. 22, Economic Nondiscrimination. (p. 18.)
St. Lucie answered that Robinson provided no evidence to support the allegation that St. Lucie unreasonably denied access to aeronautical development in violation of Grant Assurance 22, Economic Nondiscrimination. (p. 18.) St. Lucie further stated: “Robinson’s inability to develop its proposed hangar stems not from any discrimination by [St. Lucie], but instead from Robinson’s constantly changing plans and its refusal to comply with the Land Development Code or to participate in the process to amend the Airport Master Plan and Airport Layout Plan.” (p. 18.)
Citing FAA Order 5190.6B, the Director noted that under Grant Assurance 22, the sponsor of a federally obligated airport must “make the airport available as an airport for public use on reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination to all types, kinds and classes of aeronautical activities, including commercial aeronautical activities offering services to the public at the airport.” (p. 18.) Although Grant Assurance 22(a) prohibits unreasonable denial of access to an airport, “[f]ailing to conclude successful negotiations is not, in and of itself, a violation of Grant Assurance 22,” the Director stated under the authority of BMI Salvage Corp. v. Miami-Dade County, FAA Docket No. 16-05-16. (p. 18.) When there is evidence that a lease applicant is “hampering [its] own efforts” by failing to be “responsive to the requirements of the Airport” or by proposing development that is “not consistent with the Airport’s development plan,” the FAA will not find a violation of Grant Assurance 22(a), the Director added. (p. 18.)
The Director thus found sufficient similarities between the extant case and BMI so as to provide guidance. (p. 18.) Both complainants argued that the respondents failed to offer alternative development sites when the initial site failed. (p. 18.) In BMI, it was because the site was not economically feasible, and Robinson, because the site was not sufficiently large. (p. 18.) Both complainants alleged that the respondents failed to negotiate or negotiated in bad faith. (p. 18.)
On remand in BMI, the Associate Administrator found that while the complainant could propose an alternative development site the sponsor was under no obligations to provide a specific tract of land or specific facilities or infrastructure. (p. 19.) Here, the Director found that St. Lucie had no duty under its county code or FAA guidance to offer alternative development sites to Robinson. (p. 19.) Robinson abandoned its plans to develop the small parcel adjacent to Hangar 8W and failed to provide input to updating the Master Plan and ALP for development of the Tailwind Drive property. (p. 19.)
In this context, the Director reasoned that Grant Assurance 22, Economic Nondiscrimination, did not require the airport sponsor to offer certain convenience or a certain level of cost effectiveness to its tenants and airport users. (p. 19.) While St. Lucie was obligated to make airport property available for public use on reasonable terms, it was not required to avail the lot adjacent to Hangar 8W without imposing requirements for adequate storm water drainage and non-encroachment upon adjacent leaseholds. (p. 19.) In the case of the Tailwind Drive request, St. Lucie was not required to offer the property to Robinson without the property being evaluated and approved in the ALP and the Master Plan. (p. 19.) According to the Director, it would not have been an inordinate delay for the Tailwind Drive property to be included into the Airport’s scheme of development—the Master Plan was being modified at the time Robinson wanted to acquire a leasehold on Tailwind Drive. (p. 19.) Meetings were being held to consider reclassification of land so as to be developed for airport purposes and it was Robinson who elected to not attend the meetings and by not submitting proposals for inclusion of the Tailwind Drive property as development land, according to the Director. (p. 19.) These were required either by the County’s established Land Development Code or under its federal obligations in updating the airport’s ALP, the Director stated. (p. 19.)
In all, the Director found that St. Lucie was not violating Grant Assurance 22, Economic Nondiscrimination, by limiting a kind or class of aeronautical use of FPR, refusing to permit hangar construction that would provide utilization of medium-sized aircraft, large helicopters and aviation services to the public, failing to negotiate the hangar project in good faith, and refusing to allow the construction of hangars on usable land within the borders of FPR. St. Lucie did not unjustly discriminate against Robinson when it presently had only one FBO, when it required compliance with its Land Development Code or the procedures for updating the Master Plan and ALP. (p. 19.)
Issue 5—Grant Assurance 23
The final issue addressed by the Director was whether St. Lucie had violated Grant Assurance 23, Exclusive Rights, by denying Robinson the right to construct and lease hangars in competition with St. Lucie and an FBO at the airport.
St. Lucie countered that it had demonstrated its intent to attract another FBO and that it “has not denied Robinson the ability to develop a hangar at the Airport. Robinson simply failed to submit the information required by the Land Development Code, and [St. Lucie] is ‘under no obligation to provide land to a current or prospective tenant that [does] not submit a development plan for the land in question.’” (p. 20.) Robinson replied that St. Lucie was not actively seeking an additional FBO as demonstrated by the lack of evidence naming trade shows it attended or entities asked to become FBOs. (p. 20.) Robinson further averred that, “the economy is booming, hanger space in South Florida is at an all-time low and yet no new hangers have been built in recent history at the airport and APP [Jet Center] has existed as the sole, monopolistic FBO. . ..” (p. 20.) St. Lucie rebutted this, stating there was no evidence of an exclusive rights violation; St. Lucie stated that the evidence showed that Robinson twice abandoned its development plans despite St. Lucie’s responsiveness and engagement. (p. 20.)
The Director agreed with St. Lucie that there was no evidence that St. Lucie’s actions amounted to a deliberate attempt to prevent Robinson from establishing its business. (p. 20.) The Director noted that an airport sponsor may not grant a special privilege or a monopoly to anyone providing aeronautical services on the airport or engaging in an aeronautical use. (p. 20.) The intent of this restriction is to promote aeronautical activity and protect fair competition at federally obligated airports (FAA Order 5190.6B, ¶ 8.1). (p. 20.) An exclusive right is defined as a power, privilege, or other right excluding or debarring another from enjoying or exercising a like power, privilege or right. (p. 20.) An exclusive right may be conferred either by express agreement, by imposition of unreasonable standards or requirements or by another means. Such a right conferred on one or more parties, but excluding others from enjoying or exercising a similar right or rights, would be an exclusive right and in conflict with Grant Assurance No. 23. (p. 20.)
The Director further stated that where the sponsor had not entered into an express agreement, commitment, understanding, or an apparent intent to exclude other reasonably qualified enterprises, the FAA did not consider the presence of only one provider engaged in an aeronautical activity as a violation of the exclusive rights prohibition. (p. 21.) The FAA will consider the sponsor’s willingness to make the airport available to additional reasonably qualified providers. (p. 21.) Despite Robinson’s claim, there was nothing in the record to indicate that St. Lucie and/or APP Jet Center were “in competition” with Robinson. (p. 20.) There also was no proof that St. Lucie and APP Jet Center acted together to prevent Robinson from acquiring a new leasehold, from building a hangar or from becoming an FBO. (p. 21.)
Moreover, St. Lucie’s actions requiring Robinson to correct deficiencies in its application were not an intent to protect or benefit any other business already on the Airport. A complainant’s failure to provide a sponsor with adequate information upon which to form an agreement to lease land does not result in a sponsor’s violation of grant assurances. (p. 21, citing Lytton v. Sheridan County Board of County Commissioners, FAA Docket No. 16-01-16.) St. Lucie was not obligated to lease space for a commercial aeronautical activity without determining if the activity would be beneficial to the Airport and would meet the minimum standards of that airport. St. Lucie’s denial was not a violation of its federal grant assurances. (p. 21.)
Finally, the Director found no credible evidence in the record supporting Robinson’s claim that St. Lucie permitted APP Jet Center to be an exclusive FBO at the airport. (p. 22.) There was no evidence that St. Lucie allowed APP Jet Center to have a monopoly at FPR preventing the development of the Tailwind Drive proposed site. Robinson failed to support its allegation that APP Jet Center had a hold on St. Lucie. (p. 22.) Accordingly, the Director found that APP Jet Center did not hold an exclusive right at FPR resulting in St. Lucie’s violation of Grant Assurance 23, Exclusive Rights. (p. 22.) And, the Director found that St. Lucie was not violating Grant Assurance 23, Exclusive Rights, by denying Robinson the right to construct and lease hangars; Robinson is not in competition with St. Lucie and APP Jet Center for the operation of an FBO, for the sublease of property or for the construction of new hangars. (p. 22.)