Douglas Haynes v. Adams County, Colorado – No. 16-22-04
Author:
Kevin C. Willis, Director of Airport Compliance and Management Analysis
Complainant(s):
Douglas HaynesRespondent(s):
Adams County, ColoradoAirport(s):
Colorado Air and Space Port (CFO/CASP)
Holding:
Complaint dismissed (Summary Judgment).Abstract:
Complainant, Douglas Haynes, filed a complaint under 14 C.F.R. Part 16 against Adams County, Colorado, the sponsor of the Colorado Air and Space Port (“CASP”), alleging that the County discriminated against him on the basis of race, color, or national origin in violation of Grant Assurance 30, Civil Rights, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and related laws. Specifically, Haynes alleged that the County failed to provide him with a suitable office space, attempted to illegally tow his vehicles, evicted him from his storage space, hid his existence as a founding business at the airport, restricted his access to taxiways and run-up areas, and recommended FAA supported rules that directly limited his ability to establish and grow his business. (Order of the Director, pp. 1, 6.) Haynes also asserted that these actions were taken against him as a Black man since 1984 and in contrast to what had been done or allowed for his White business competitors. (Order of the Director, p. 1.)
In response, the County filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The County argued that the complaint “(1) does not comply with 14 C.F.R. § 16.23(b)(2); (2) does not state a claim that surpasses the plausibility standards of Twombly and Iqbal; (3) does not state a claim against the correct legal entity; and (4) does not state a claim which adequately pleads the necessary elements of racial discrimination.”
In his order, the Director noted that it was uncontroverted that Haynes, a Black man, was a member of a protected class but, rather, no issue of material fact existed as to the following items.
• Office Space. Haynes alleged that the County did not provide him with suitable office space “as promised over and over again even though I have been on the waiting list for years but looked over more than once to the benefit of my fellow white business competitors.” He further asserted that Air Methods was such a competitor and that this claim is “substantiated by both Airport administration records, and numerous FAA title 14 violation based on investigation/filings notes obtains [sic] as recent as in 2014 and now 2022, but as far back as 1984.” (Order of the Director, p. 8.) According to the Director, however, Complainant failed to make a prima facie case as he did not identify someone outside of his protected class that was treated differently under the same circumstances. (Order of the Director, p. 8.) There was no direct evidence of discrimination, and the County offered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not providing office space—Complainant had not applied for office space and his lease made no mention of office space. (Order of the Director, p. 8.) Thus, no evidence existed to show that County’s reason was a pretext for discrimination. Because the Director found that Complainant failed to make a prima facie case, summary judgment was proper on this issue. (Order of the Director, p. 8.)
• Vehicle Towing. Complainant alleged that the County’s attempts to illegally tow his vehicles in “contrast to [his] fellow white business counterparts based here at the spaceport . . . has directly limit[ed his] ability to . . . establish, grow, or sustain” his businesses. (Order of the Director, p. 9.) The County countered that it had no record of towing Haynes’ vehicles and noted that Haynes did not provide any evidence that his vehicles were towed or how other people were treated differently. (Order of the Director, p. 9.) In addition, the County argued that Haynes’ lease requires him to comply with all lawful rules, regulations, laws, and ordinances at the airport and that “Adams County zoning regulations prohibits the outdoor storage of unlicensed and/or inoperable vehicles.” (Order of the Director, p. 9.)
In this context, the Director ruled that Complainant had not provided any evidence that his vehicles were ever towed or that there was an attempt to tow the vehicles. (Order of the Director, p. 9.) Additionally, Complainant did not provide evidence that the County treated him differently than other similarly situated individuals not in his protected class when the County allegedly notified him of its intent to tow his vehicles. (Order of the Director, p. 9.) Accordingly, Complainant had not established a prima facie case sufficient to prevail on summary judgment as no direct evidence of discrimination existed, and the County offered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action—his lease stipulates that he must abide by all rules, regulations, laws, and ordinances at the airport and the County was enforcing zoning laws related to vehicle parking. Complainant did not controvert the language of his lease or the County’s enforcement of its zoning laws. (Order of the Director, p. 9.)
• Eviction. Complainant next argued that the County discriminated against him when they evicted him from his storage space. (Order of the Director, p. 10.) The County argued that the “Complainant received no different treatment from similarly situated persons. He had a lease with CASP, refused to follow the rules for using CASP facilities, and was evicted in similar fashion to other tenants of non-protected classes.” (Order of the Director, p. 10.) The County further provided (with documentation) that it did not single out Complainant and had evicted the Lucien Frank Company, a tenant not of Mr. Haynes’ protected class. (Order of the Director, p. 10.) Furthermore, the County stated that “Inspections of the [Haynes] unit revealed numerous substantial violations . . . including storage of materials other than airworthy aircraft and ground handling equipment.” (Order of the Director, p. 10.) The County provided a notice of lease termination for the end of the next month and Complainant refused to remove his belongings; therefore, the County initiated and prevailed on a complaint for forcible entry and detainer. (Order of the Director, p. 10.)
Given these facts, the Director ruled that no direct evidence of discrimination existed on Complainant’s eviction allegation, and the County provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Complainant’s eviction—violation of the lease terms. “Mr. Haynes’ complaint admits that he used the space as ‘storage’ and a temporary office for many years. Past allowances do not guarantee continued use in violation of a lease. Additionally, County’s reasons for lease termination were in accordance with FAA policy that hangars located on airport property must be used for an aeronautical purpose, unless otherwise approved by the FAA Office of Airports” (FAA Policy on the Non-Aeronautical Use of Airport Hangars, 81 Fed. Reg. 38906, 38910, Section II.a. (June 15, 2016)). (Order of the Director, p. 11.)
• Business Activity. Complainant argued that the County violated his civil rights by their efforts to:
- hide my existences as one of the successful founding businesses of both the airport in 1984 and spaceport in 2019, by falsely testifying about my company’s operational status in federal court, not posting any of my business names/logos, or allowing me to display them myself, at the airport or even in the spaceport’s officially publishes [sic] documents/online webpages set up for public media accessible consumption.
(Order of the Director, p. 11.) According to the Director, however, Complainant did not provide any evidence that he requested to post his business name/logo at the airport or on webpages or displays. (Order of the Director, p. 12.) Beyond providing the URL address of the airport’s website, Complainant did not submit any evidence to support his allegation that others not in his protected class were provided these opportunities, the Director found. (Order of the Director, p. 11.) The Complainant had the burden of establishing his case and could not rely upon the Director to search a website or a facility for documents to support the allegations, moreover. (Order of the Director, p. 11.) Consequently, here too, Complainant failed to make a prima facie case and summary judgment was proper, according to the Director. (Order of the Director, p. 11.)
• Access to Taxiways and Run-Up Areas. Complainant asserted that, in contrast to his White business competitors such as Air Methods, the County had made efforts to restrict him “from utilizing normal publicly accessible taxi ways, and or standard test engine run-up areas.” (Order of the Director, p. 12.) The County argued that it had not denied Complainant access to taxiways or run-up areas, but rather had safety policies and procedures that applied equally to all users. (Order of the Director, p. 12.) Respondent also contended that the Complainant had not cited a “specific incident or what ‘efforts’ CASP has taken to prevent his access or how, if at all, he was actually prevented from accessing them.” (Order of the Director, p. 12.) The County further provided that “[n]ormal run-ups of aircraft engines occur at will and are un-regulated and happen all the time in designated areas …” (Order of the Director, p. 12.) Hence, the Director found that Complainant did not provide any evidence that he was denied access to the runways, taxiways or run-up areas of the airport, and consequently, summary judgment was appropriate in the County as a matter of law. (Order of the Director, p. 12.)
• Proposing Regulations. Complainant asserted that the County acted to “suggest, or willfully recommend FAA supported rules that directly limit [his] ability to grow or sustain” his business. (Order of the Director, p. 12.) He referenced “personal limiting rules suggested/filed/created against my business such as no schedule airliner flight allowed in the 80’s, or the more recently created/established, no unman eVTOL test flights.” (Order of the Director, p. 12.) He argued that the allegations are substantiated by:
- Via one-on-one private meetings with me, the airport administrators clear learned/conceived and knew I was the only operation on the air/spaceport seeking to engaging [sic] in such activities, so therefore moved to effectively block any and all attempts, thereby severally [sic] disrupting my ability to succeed for decades. Airport Administration records, and numerous FAA title 14 violation based investigation notes obtains [sic] as recent as 2019 to 2022, but as far back as 2016.
(Order of the Director, p. 12.) The County argued that Complainant did not provide “any evidence CASP ‘recommend[ed] FAA supported rules’ to target his operations in a discriminatory manner.” (Order of the Director, p. 13.) Moreover, the County noted that Complainant had not identified what rules conflict with his business, and he has not provided any evidence that they have recommended rules to target his operations in a discriminatory manner. (Order of the Director, p. 13.)
Thus, the Director determined that while Complainant made reference to limitations on scheduled airliner flights in the 1980s and no allowances for unmanned eVTOL flights, he did not identify the rules or provide any evidence of discriminatory intent behind these rules or restrictions. (Order of the Director, p. 13.) Added the Director: “Beyond uncorroborated references to one-on-one private meetings, airport administration records, and investigation notes obtained between 2016 to 2022, Mr. Haynes did not show any evidence to support his allegations, for example evidence of adverse actions or that the reason for the unspecified actions was to target the complainant, and not for safety or another legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose. He does not provide any evidence of the meetings, administration records, or notes that he references.” (Order of the Director, p. 13.)
In all, the Director found no indication that the County had violated Grant Assurance 30, Civil Rights, or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.